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Abstract 
 
In this paper I present a model that was built in order to analyse the interdependencies 
between labour market dynamics and the evolution of industries structure, in situations 
where interpersonal links among workers influence individuals job decisions. The 
model was inspired by the case of industries that rely heavily on highly skilled labour 
and in which problems of incomplete information abound. The causal mechanisms here 
proposed constitute an alternative explanation for a number of well-known regularities 
of industry evolution and of labour mobility, being arguably more suitable to the 
analysis of those industries than the formal models available in the literature. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Industrial evolution and labour market dynamics are two fields of economic research 
which have developed fast in the past two decades. In both cases such development was 
very much related with the increased availability of micro data, and of statistic and 
econometric tools suitable to their treatment; and these, in turn, have favoured the 
identification of a number of empirical regularities (which are often taken as stylised 
facts in both domains). Partly as a consequence, new theoretical models were proposed, 
aiming at explaining the regularities found in the data. There are even cases of authors 
who have worked in both fields, either on the theoretical front (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979, 
1982) or on the empirical one (Addison and Portugal, 2002; Mata and Portugal, 2004). 
 
Notwithstanding, the development of those two fields of research has been essentially 
parallel in nature. The most quoted models of industrial dynamics (for surveys see, e.g., 
Dosi et al., 1997; Sutton, 1997; Caves, 1998) tend to focus on the technological or 
financial determinants of changes in the structure of industries. In the same vein, the 
reference models of labour mobility and job matching (for a survey see, e.g., Farber, 
1999) typically underestimate the mutual influence between industry dynamics and 
labour market forces. 
 
And, however, it is not a surprise that changes in industries structure and worker 
mobility mutually influence each other in many different ways, though not always in the 
most obvious ones. For example, some of the most influential empirical papers on 
industrial dynamics (e.g., Dunne et al, 1988, 1989; Evans, 1988) have noted that gross 
creation and destruction of jobs were associated with the dynamics of industries, though 
the proportion of job creation and destruction is significantly lower that the associate 
proportion of firm entry and exit (which is explained by the fact that entry and exit 
typically occur at low firm sizes). Moreover, as Haveman (1995) has pointed out, 
industry turbulence affects the labour markets not only directly (when individuals 
employed in established firms move to newly created ones, and individuals employed in 
dissolved or merged organizations move to surviving ones), but also indirectly, through 
the vacancy chains that are opened and closed by firms founding and failure. This does 
not mean, however, that the relation between firms growth and job flows is a 
monotonic one; Albaek and Sorensen (1998) have shown that the quit rate is not 
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affected by the amount of employment growth at the firm level (a large amount of 
separations occurs in expanding plants, suggesting that workers are leaving to obtain 
better jobs matches), and, symmetrically, that hiring occurs even in contracting firms, 
although at lower rates. In any case, it is not only the dynamics of industries that affect 
job flows, but also the reverse; for example, several recent studies analyse how the 
survival prospects of new firms are affected by the prior experience of their founders 
(Helfat and Liberman, 2002; Geroski et al., 2003; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2004; Dahl and 
Reichstein, 2005), drawing attention to the impact of workers mobility between 
potentially competing firms for the patterns of industry evolution. 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of all those evidences on the interdependency between industry 
evolution and labour market dynamics, there remains a lack of systematic discussion 
(both theoretical and empirical) about the details of such co-evolution and its 
implications. 
 
This is not without relevance, especially when we realize that such interdependency can 
be crucial in many real world industries. In fact, historical accounts of specific 
industries often show that the patterns of firms evolution and of labour force mobility 
are intrinsically related, particularly in the case of those services industries which are 
highly dependent on a specialized labour force. For example, in a paper on the evolution 
of the IT consultancy industry in Portugal (Mamede, 2002) I have suggested that the 
growth of firms was very much affected by their capacity to recruit new specialists and 
to avoid poaching by competitors. I have also suggested that the general level of 
employees skills strongly influences the quality of the services provided, and therefore 
firms reputation and their prospects for future growth. The same conclusions are 
usually drawn from other studies on professional services industries (see Gallouj and 
Gallouj, 1996). 
 
When this is the case, models of industry evolution which ignore the role of labour 
market dynamics, and models of job mobility which abstract from the competitive 
pressures in which employers are involved, risk missing the main elements of the 
dynamic picture they propose to explain. 
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In this paper I present a model that was built in order to analyse the interdependencies 
between labour market dynamics and the evolution of industries structure, in situations 
where individuals job decisions are influenced by interpersonal links among workers. 
 
The fact that social networks can, and often do, influence the dynamics of labour market 
has been recurrently emphasized by economic sociologists, following the work by 
Granovetter (1988, 1995). Studies within this tradition have revealed that employers and 
employees tend to know (or, at least, have information about) each other even before the 
beginning of their labour relation. These previous interpersonal links often influence 
individuals job trajectories in several ways: social networks are an effective 
distribution channel of information about job opportunities, information given by 
personal acquaintances about the nature of a job are often taken to be more detailed and 
exact (and therefore more reliable), friends may facilitate individual integration and 
learning in organizations, having personal acquaintances among colleagues can 
facilitate the access to promotion and other discretionary benefits (especially, if those 
acquaintances are well positioned in the organizational power structure, and if contracts 
are more difficult be drawn exhaustively and to be enforced).  
 
Previous contacts can exist due to reasons unrelated to the workings of the labour 
market, but they can also be a by-product of professional activity. As Cattani et al. 
(2002) suggest, the migration of individuals between organizations alters the webs of 
social relationships, both internal and external, with consequences over the performance 
of firms. In particular, when an individual leaves an organization she takes with her 
relevant knowledge about clients, technologies, organizational designs, access to 
resources (financial, material, and human), which can have disruptive effects in that 
organization (and significant benefits to her new employer). 
 
The model I propose here is particularly suited to analyse the co-evolution of social 
networks, job flows and industry structure. Being inspired by the case of consultancy 
services, the model takes into account some other features typically found in those 
industries.  
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To start with, problems of incomplete information are pervasive in those industries. 
Consultancy is a highly idiosyncratic process in which the employees of both the 
services providing firms and of the client organizations interact extensively, and the 
outcomes of which strongly depend on the quality of the interactions between the 
personnel of both organizations. Given the relevance of idiosyncratic elements for 
performance, the relevant individual skills are not easily assessed on the basis of 
diplomas or other certificates. Moreover, consulting projects are most of the times a 
work done by teams of specialists, and it is often the case that firms are not able to 
differentiate between the individual contributions of each of the members involved. 
These features have two important implications: first, employers have to rely on less 
than perfect proxies of individual skills  such as individuals past job trajectories; 
second, individuals are typically not paid on the basis of their individual productivity 
performance prizes that compensate the several members of the teams without 
discriminating on the basis of individual efforts are a common feature in the industry 
(giving an incentive for individuals to move to the best performing firms, where 
collective prizes are expected to be higher). 
 
In the absence of such uncertainty, the outcome of the industrys evolution would be 
very straightforward: the most successful firms would employ the most skilled 
specialists and would unequivocally grow (and possibly eliminate all the rivals). 
Introducing information incompleteness in the functioning of the labour markets has a 
number of implications, which the model presented below allows to analyse. 
 
The next section of the paper presents the model. In section 3 the main results of the 
simulation are discussed. Section 4 sums up the conclusions and implications. 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
There are only two types of agents in the model: firms and specialised workers (or 
specialists). Firms provide consultancy services to the market, while specialists are 
employed by those firms. The consultancy services are assumed to be in high demand, 
so the size of the industry is constrained only by the number of specialists available. In 
what follows I present the assumptions concerning the decisions of firms and 
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individuals, the role of social networks, the functioning of the labour market, and the 
dynamics of the industry. 
 
 
2.1. The decision of firms  
 
The model assumes that firms aim at earning higher profits. Profits increase 
monotonically with the scale of services provision (i.e., the size of the firm) and with 
the fees charged by the services provided.  
 
The size of a firm is given by the number of specialists in its payroll. Since profits 
increase with size, firms want to grow as much as possible and they do so by recruiting 
more specialists. The model imposes restrictions on the growth of firms, assuming that 
the pace of growth can be faster for smaller firms than for larger ones1. The maximum 
number of job contracts each firm can perform at each period, MCjt, is fixed according 
to the following equation:  
 
(1)  MCjt = [Njt-1*δ] + 1 
 
where Njt is the number of employees of firm j at time t, and δ>1 is a growth rate 
parameter. 
 
The level of fees per specialists is assumed to be dependent on the firms performance 
in the previous period. The performance of firm j at period t, PFjt, is defined as the 
average real skills of the firms employees, that is: 
 
 (2)  PFjt = ΣRSjit/Njt 
 
where Njt is the number of individuals working for firm j at time t, and RSjit represents 
the real skills of individual i who is working for firm j at time t. Individuals real skills 
are assumed to be identically and independently distributed, according to a normal 
probability function, at the beginning of the simulation, and to stay fixed thereafter. 
                                                
1 This is in accordance with most empirical findings concerning the so-called Gibrats law of 
proportionate effects (see surveys by Caves, 1998; Dosi et al., 1997; Sutton, 1997). 
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Since performance contributes positively to profits, and since the former is determined 
by the average level of specialists real skills, firms are interested in recruiting the most 
skilled individuals. However, it is assumed that individuals real skills cannot be 
directly observed by the market. In order to assess individuals skills, firms take into 
account the performance of the firms in which the individual has worked in the past.  
Accordingly, the skills individual i is expected to hold at time t are given by the 
equation:  
 
(3) ESit = ESit-1*β + PFijt-1*(1-β) 
 
where β є [0,1] is the autocorrelation factor of individuals expected skills (it is the same 
for all individuals), and PFijt-1 is the performance of the firm (j) employing individual i 
at time t. 
 
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that there are no costs to the firms except for the 
wages paid to specialists. Furthermore, it is assumed that, in this industry, specialists 
wages are a function of individuals expected skills, and that the fees per worker paid by 
clients are more than enough for firms to cover their wage costs. The difference 
between total revenues and total wage costs is partially used by firms to give 
performance prizes to their employees. This has implications for individuals choices, as 
will become immediately clear.  
 
 
2.2. The decision of individuals and the role of social networks  
 
Individuals prefer to work for firms with a better performance, and this is so for two 
cumulative reasons: first, their immediate financial benefits tend to be higher due to the 
fact that firms which perform better pay higher performance prizes; second, since 
specialists are paid according to their expected skills, and since the latter depend on the 
performance of the firms they have worked for in the past, they have an additional 
incentive to work for firms which show high performance levels. 
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However, in assessing the value of working for each firm, it is assumed that individuals 
consider not only the performance of that firm, but also the number of links they have 
with other specialists working for the same firm, according to the equation:  
 
(4) Vijt = PFjt-1 * [1 + FF(α, NLijt-1)] 
 
where Vijt is the value to individual i of working for firm j at time t, PFjt-1 is the 
performance of firm j at time t, and FF(α, NLijt-1) is a function specifying the impact of 
interpersonal links on individuals i valuation of firm j as an employer (henceforth, the 
friendship function). 
 
Three alternative specifications of the friendship function are considered in the 
simulations  a linear form, a logarithmic form, and an exponential form  and they are 
represented by the following equations: 
 
 (5)  FF(α, NLijt-1) = α*NLijt-1 
 (5) FF(α, NLijt-1) = α*Ln(NLijt-1+1) 
 (5) FF(α, NLijt-1) = α*exp(NLijt-1)1/2 
 
In all three equations, α>0 (henceforth, the link value parameter) determines the 
inclination of each curve, Ln represents the natural logarithmic function, exp stands for 
the natural exponential function, and NLijt-1 is the number of individuals among those 
working for firm j who are linked to i at time t. 2 
 
In words, when assessing the value of working for a certain firm, each individual takes 
into account that firms performance level and adds to this value some percentage points 
for each link he has among the firms employees. Given any two firms with identical 
performance levels, an individual prefers to work to the firm in which he has a higher 
number of personal links. When the linear friendship function is used, the marginal 
value of each link is constant, irrespectively of the number of links the individual 
already has among the firms employees. The logarithmic friendship function implies 
instead the assumption that individuals value much more the first links they established 
                                                
2 In the logarithmic function, 1 was added inside the parenthesis in order to avoid negative values. In the 
exponential function the value in the parenthesis was squared rooted in order the smooth the function. 
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within a firm, than the additional links they establish after being densely networked to 
the firms employees. The opposite assumption underlies the exponential friendship 
function.  
 
Links between individual specialists are established as a by-product of labour market 
flows. That is, in each period, for every pair of individuals currently working for the 
same firm, there is a chance that a social link is established (in case those individuals 
were not yet previously linked). The probability of two not yet linked colleagues 
becoming friends (conceptualized as a Bernoulli trial) is a decreasing function of the 
size of the employing firm3; more specifically, the probability that a link is established 
between any two specialists i and k, working for firm j at period t (and who were not 
previously linked), is given by: 
 
 (6) p(a link is established between i and k) = 1/Njt  
 
where Njt is the number of specialists employed by i and ks employer at time t. A link 
between any two individuals will hold regardless of their future job trajectories 
 
 
2.3. The job matching mechanism 
 
Let me summarize what was stated above. Firms want to recruit as many specialists as 
possible, and want to attract the best specialists in the market. In this intent they face a 
number of constraints: first, the total number of specialists available in the market is 
limited by a certain amount, so firms compete among them in recruitment; second, firms 
are not able to assess the real skills of specialists, and have to take expected skills as an 
approximation to their real value; third, the model imposes a limit to the growth rate of 
firms per period. On the other side of the market, specialists are willing to work for 
firms with good technical performances and which employ a high number of specialists 
personal links. On this, prospective specialists face as well a basic constraint: firms have 
a limited number of job positions to fill, and therefore only the specialists with the 
highest levels of expected skills will be recruited by the most desirable firms.  
                                                
3 The intuition behind this is that as firms get bigger it gets harder for personal contacts among any two of 
its employees to be established. 
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The job matching is done in the following way. Every period the labour market opens 
up. The list of specialists in the market is sorted in decreasing order of their expected 
skills and, for each individual, the list of firms is sorted in decreasing order of their 
value as employers. The first specialist in the list of individuals is allocated to the first 
job vacancy available, starting from the firm he values the most as an employer, and 
following the sorted list of firms; when the matching between the first individual and 
his preferred job vacancy has been achieved, the process is repeated for the other 
individuals in the list, following the ranking of expected skills, until all specialists have 
been allocated to some firm4.  
 
 
2.4. Entry and exit of firms 
 
In the beginning of the simulation there are no firms. From then on, at each simulation 
step, a new firm enters the market. One individual (the entrepreneur) is randomly picked 
among all the specialists, and allocated to the new firm.  
 
While incumbents are evaluated by prospective employees on the basis of their past 
performance (together with the personal links prospective employees have with current 
employees), new firms can only be assessed on the basis on their entrepreneurs skills. 
Therefore, the model assumes that specialists expectations on new firms performance 
correspond to the expected skills of those firms entrepreneurs. The expected skills of 
those individuals who have not yet been employed are equal to the mean value of the 
distribution of real skills.  
  
As a consequence, in the first step of the simulation specialists will be randomly ranked 
and a given number of them will be allocated to the first firm entering the market5. But 
since individuals real skills differ, from the very first simulation steps firms will 
display different performance levels, will be differently involved in the network of 
personal links, and will accordingly start to differ in their capacity to recruit specialists. 
                                                
4 Since firms are assumed to be willing to grow as much as possible (given some constraints in the pace 
of growth), after a few number of iterations there will be no unemployed specialists. 
5 The maximum number of initial vacancies is a parameter of the model. 
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On the other hand, specialists will immediately start to differ in their expected skills 
according to the firms they have been working for. 
 
Along the process, some firms will grow and others will shrink. When incumbent firms 
loose all its employees, or when a new firm is not able to recruit any specialist besides 
its founder for two subsequent periods, they exit the industry (in the case of 
unsuccessful entries, the new firms entrepreneurs will re-enter the labour market, and 
eventually be recruited by an incumbent firm).  
 
I turn now to the analysis of the possible outcomes of such dynamics. 
 
 
 
3. THE RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION 
 
The main aim of the model which was presented in section 3 is the study of the possible 
interdependencies between labour market dynamics and industry structures. In order to 
do that I focus on the analysis of changes in some elements of the model, while others 
are left unchanged. 
 
In all the simulation runs both the number of specialists and the number of periods 
(which determines the number of firms entering the market) was fixed at 2506. The 
mean of the distribution of individuals real skills was normalised to 1 and the standard 
deviation was fixed at 0,25. The autocorrelation factor of individuals expected skills 
(parameter β in equation 3) was fixed at 0,9. The initial maximum scale of potential 
entrants was fixed at 3, and the growth rate parameter (δ in equation 1) was fixed at 
1,05. Moderate changes in these values do not modify the main conclusions to be drawn 
below. 
 
In order to avoid unnecessary complications, and given the aim of the present model, 
the focus in the analysis of simulation outcomes is restricted to variations in (i) the 
value individuals attach to links with other specialists when assessing firms as potential 
                                                
6 This choice was determined by the constraints imposed by the software used for the analysis of the 
results. 
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employers (parameter α in equations 5, 5 and 5), and (ii) the functional form of the 
friendship function (same equations).  
 
Each simulation for each set of values of these parameters was repeated 50 times in 
order to test the robustness of the results. A table displaying the means and coefficients 
of variation of selected indicators over the 50 runs of each parameterization is presented 
in annex.  
 
The main indicators used in the analysis were the following7: 
 
final number of incumbents:  includes all firms who employ more than 1 
individual at the final step of the simulation; 
four-firm concentration ratio:  it is the combined market share of the four 
largest firms in the industry (ranging from 0 
to 100) (CR4); 
Hirshman-Herfindahl index:  it is the sum of squares of the market shares 
of all the firms in the market (ranging from 0 
to 10.000) (HHI); 
industry turbulence:  it is the sum of firm exits and entries divided 
by the total number of incumbents;  
proportion of job changes:  it corresponds to the number of individuals 
who have moved to a new firm divided by 
the total employment; 
network density:  it is the number of pairwise links that were 
established among individuals over the total 
number of possible pairwise links; 
proportion of external links:  it is calculated in the same way as the 
network density, but it excludes from the 
denominator the links between individuals 
working for the same firm. 
 
 
The remaining of this section presents the most relevant results of the simulation 
exercises. 
                                                
7 With the exception of the first one in the list, all indicators are computed at every step of the simulation. 
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3.1. The baseline model  irrelevance of interpersonal links 
 
When specialists do not attach any value to interpersonal links (or when these are 
simply absent), individuals job decisions are determined only by the performance of 
the firms in the market. That is, individuals will prefer to work to firms with the best 
performance possible. But since firms performance levels are determined by the 
average value of real skills of their employees, the performance levels of firms will vary 
as they grow and as workers move from firm to firm. This gives rise to such dynamic 
patterns as the ones illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Industry and labour market dynamics  
when links among individuals have no value 
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The graphs presented above illustrate the main patterns of industry evolution and labour 
market dynamics. On the left-side we have the evolution of firms size, with the vertical 
axis measuring the number of employees. The right-side graph shows both the evolution 
in the number of incumbents and the proportion of individuals changing jobs at each 
period.  
 
In Figure 1 we observe a situation of great instability, where firms grow quickly after 
they enter the market, until they reach a peak. After that point the number of employees 
rapidly decreases, and the firm eventually exits the market. It can also be noticed that 
the patterns of job mobility follow closely the evolution of incumbent firms: when the 
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number of incumbents is small, the proportion of employees moving to a different firm 
in each period is lower; contrarily, it is in the periods during which a higher number of 
firms is able to survive after entry that we observe the highest levels of job changes.  
 
Such pattern has already been identified and discussed in a previous paper (Mamede, 
2005). As was pointed out then, the cause for such behaviour resides on a paradoxical 
process in which competitive success is itself the cause of firms failure. As a result of 
both the random process of firm creation (which leads to firms entering the market with 
varying levels of performance, depending on their entrepreneurs skills) and the noisy 
job matching mechanism, a certain firm is able to sustain high levels of performance for 
a number of periods. Its superior performance allows it to hire more employees than the 
competitors, and consequently it grows above the average. Ideally, this firm would be 
able to identify the best specialists to hire, and the most skilled individuals in the market 
would want to be employed by such firm (since it would certainly be the best 
performing firm in the industry). But as the firm grows, since it cannot perfectly assess 
individuals real skills, the firm will eventually start to hire specialists whose skills are 
below the firms current average, and therefore its performance will start to decrease. 
The most direct competitors will soon surpass the firms performance level and start to 
attract its employees, starting with the ones most valuable to the market (which tends to 
accelerate the process of declining performance and consequent shrinking). One of such 
competitors eventually becomes the biggest firm in the industry, and as it reaches its 
highest level of performance the same process happens again and again, until the end of 
the simulation. 
 
Thus, the present case is one in which a combination of perfect employee mobility, 
incomplete information about individuals skills, and absence of interpersonal links, 
gives rise to patterns of industry evolution and labour market dynamics characterized by 
great instability. In the following sections I discuss how such outcomes are changed as a 
result of individuals attaching value to interpersonal links when making their job 
decisions.8 
 
                                                
8 In Mamede (2005) I discuss the effects of introducing mobility costs in the context of a similar baseline 
model. It would also be interesting to analyse the consequences of changing the hypothesis on 
information (in)completeness in labour market decisions. 
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3.2. The value of interpersonal links (the linear case) 
 
As explained in part 2 above, the worth of interpersonal links (henceforth referred to as 
link value) is here modelled in a straightforward fashion: given any two firms with 
identical performance levels, an individual prefers to work to the firm within which she 
has the highest number of personal links. In the next section I discuss the effects of 
different functional forms of the friendship function, while in the present section, for 
illustrative purposes, I consider the case of a linear function.  
 
It should be clear what to expect in terms of individual decisions when we start 
considering the presence of valuable interpersonal links: as the industry evolves, 
individuals will establish links with some of the other employees working for the same 
firm; while the number of friendships is low, interpersonal links should not prevent 
the mobility of workers between firms; but such links will subsist even if individuals 
move to different firms, and they will influence individuals future job trajectories; 
firms employing a higher number of someones friends will become more attractive to 
that individual as potential employers; thus, we can expect to observe groups of friends 
ending up working for the same firms; furthermore, as interpersonal links are fostered 
inside firms, when individuals stay for longer periods in the same firm it becomes more 
probable that they establish links with all the others co-employees (namely, with those 
that did not influence the individuals initial decision to work there). In sum, 
introducing interpersonal links as a factor influencing individuals job decisions is 
expected to bring about some stabilization in the evolution of industry structure.  
 
As a matter of fact, this will be shown to be the case. Irrespectively of the functional 
form used to account for the value of interpersonal links, as the level of link value 
increases, the proportion of individuals changing jobs at each period decreases and the 
industry becomes less turbulent (i.e., the number of incumbent firms stabilizes). The 
precise way in which that happens, and its consequences in terms of industry evolution 
and labour market dynamics is contingent on the combination of the levels of the link 
value parameter and the specification of the friendship function. 
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Figure 2 below illustrates how increases in the level of the link value parameter affect 
the patterns of the industrys structural evolution, for the case of a linear friendship 
function.  
 
 
Figure 2  The impact of changes in link value on the patterns of industry evolution 
(linear friendship function) 
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The graph above shows the impact of interpersonal links in an individuals assessment 
of a firm as a prospective employer: on the horizontal axis we have the number of 
links among that firms employees, and on the vertical axis we have the corresponding 
increase in the individuals valuation of that firm. The graph displays three distinct 
areas, which are delimited by two lines representing different levels of the link value 
parameter. For example, the lower line corresponds to fixing the link value at 0,5%; 
this means that, when evaluating a firm as prospective employer, an individual will add 
5% to the level of that firms performance if such firm employs 10 specialists to whom 
that individual is linked.  
 
The areas shown in the graph represent three types of industry structure outcomes that 
are obtained as the level of link value increases. As one could expect, for low levels of 
link value (area I) the model does not behave differently from the case of valueless 
interpersonal links, which was discussed before.  
 
However, above a certain threshold of the link value parameter the model starts to 
reveal more stable dynamic patterns. For intermediate levels of the link value 
parameter (approximately, in the range 0,5-1,5% - area II in Figure 2), after an initial 
(III) unconcentrated, 
stable structure
(II) concentrated 
structure
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period of high incumbents turbulence and frequent job changes, the industry stabilizes 
in a highly concentrated structure, typically a monopoly. Figure 3 below shows the main 
features of such situation.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Industry and labour market dynamics  
for intermediate levels of the link value parameter 
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In addition to the graphs displaying the firms size and the turnover of firms and 
individuals (which were introduced in Figure 1 above), Figure 3 presents two other 
graphs. On the lower-left quadrant we have the CR4 and the HHI concentration indexes. 
The lower-right chart shows the evolution of the network density, together with the 
external links statistic (which only considers the links among individuals working for 
different firms, when calculating the network density).  
 
Just as in the case of irrelevant interpersonal links, during the first half of the simulation 
run we can observe a recurrent situation in which some successful firm grows above the 
others for some periods, and then it invariably starts shrinking until it looses all its 
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employees. However, two main differences can be identified from the simple inspection 
of Figure 3: first, the successive leading firms are able to reach increasing scales and 
survive for longer periods; second, in this sequence of successive leaderships, at some 
point one firm is able to capture all the labour force, and from that moment onwards it 
becomes the indisputable monopolist.   
 
Again, it is immediately clear how the introduction of interpersonal link effects brings 
about this aggregate outcome. At every step of the industry evolution, new interpersonal 
links are being established among co-workers. As the number of links grows, they 
increasingly interfere in individuals job decisions. During the initial stage of the 
process the number of links is not sufficiently high to avoid great job turnover; this 
allows the simultaneous presence of a relatively high number of incumbent firms, which 
operate in a rather unstable competitive environment (along the lines described before 
for the baseline simulation). But as the number of links grow, the friendship effect will 
allow some firms to attract an increasingly high number of individuals to their ranks; 
the reverse of this is that it becomes ever more difficult for other firms to survive, 
leading to a shake-out in the number of incumbents, soon after the industry has 
reached its highest number of operating firms. After some firm has become the 
dominant player in the industry (i.e., it captures at least 40% of the labour force), it 
takes very demanding conditions for another firm to overcome the dominant one.  
 
In order to understand how changes in industry dominance can take place, one needs to 
take into account the fact that firms are not born equal; in fact, when they enter the 
market their initial performance is dependent on the skills of their first employees, in 
particular the ones of the founding entrepreneur. Furthermore, entrepreneurs are 
differently positioned in the network of interpersonal links, which means that, from the 
very beginning, firms are differently able to attract individuals and retain them in their 
ranks. After the industrys shake-out takes place, only firms that enter the market with 
very high performance levels and with considerable links to other firms employees 
(preferably, highly skilled individuals) are able to survive. Still, these are necessary, but 
not sufficient conditions for survival. In fact, it may happen that a firm which enters the 
market with high performance levels and which benefits from numerous interpersonal 
links is nevertheless unlucky during the noisy job matching processes (i.e., in a number 
of successive periods the firm hires individuals whose skills are lower than expected). 
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In sum, for intermediate levels of the link value parameter, as the selection conditions 
become tougher (due to the increasing density of interpersonal networks, especially 
within the dominant firms), firm survival demands not only superior characteristics 
(performance and network links), but also chance. At a certain stage the density of the 
network of interpersonal links is too strong for any entering firm to be able to capture 
employees to its ranks, and the industry stabilizes in a monopolistic structure.  
 
Finally, for higher levels of the link value parameter (approximately, for values above 
1,5%  area III in Figure 2), we obtain less concentrated patterns of industry structure. 
In fact, after some threshold, further increases in the level of link value imply an 
increase in the average number of incumbents and a corresponding decrease in the 
concentration ratios. Figure 4 below presents the typical outcome of a simulation when 
the link value parameter is fixed at 2,5% (using the linear form of the friendship 
function). 
 
 
Figure 4 - Industry and labour market dynamics  
for moderate levels of the link value parameter 
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As can be seen in the graphs above, some of the dynamic patterns are common to the 
ones identified for intermediate levels of the link value parameter: once again we have 
an initial period during which many firms enter the market and are able to survive and 
grow for a number of periods, and during which individuals are changing jobs 
frequently; after that, some firms are able to grow above the others, attracting a high 
number of workers, and causing a shake-out in the number of incumbent firms. But the 
similarities with the previous case stop here. In fact, by comparing the graphs it can be 
noticed that the proportion of job changes in the initial period has decreased. This 
means that, as could be expected, interpersonal links start to influence individuals job 
decision since the early evolution of the industry; as a result, individuals more easily 
get stuck in a firm (which explains why the proportion of links external to the 
individuals own employing firms is even lower than before  see chart in the bottom-
right quadrant).  
 
Consequently, firms which perform well enough in the early stage are more likely to 
survive, even if their performance levels decrease afterwards  since they can rely on 
the influence of interpersonal links among its employees to prevent poaching from 
competitors. The first-mover advantages are not limited to the ability to retain present 
employees: firms that enter the market early and which maintain high levels of 
performance for a while are more able to attract individuals with high expected skills 
(and retain them in their ranks afterwards).  
 
However, such first-mover advantages are not absolute. As illustrated in Figure 4, 
even firms which attempt to enter the industry after the shake-out episode may be able 
to grow and survive. This is because the successful incumbents tend to reduce their 
performance levels as they grow; just as in the case where interpersonal links were 
irrelevant (see Figure 1), growth is a source of risk to firms, since in order to grow firms 
have to hire individuals whose skills may be lower than the firms current average (and 
in fact this can be expected to happen after some point, since firms start by hiring those 
individuals whose expected skills are highest). But in the present case, the risk of 
growth is not as high as before, since firms can rely on the network of interpersonal 
links. That is, market leaders can afford to have lower performance levels than 
competitors. Therefore, as long as their entrepreneurs are highly skilled and have good 
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links to other workers, late-comers may still achieve a considerable competitive 
position.  
 
But this is true only up to some point. After a number of periods the network of 
interpersonal links inside the firms is so dense that it becomes virtually impossible for 
prospective entrants to attract workers to their ranks. Every attempt by an entrepreneur 
to launch a new venture is doomed to failure (and those individuals tend to go back to 
their former employing firm, where the number of interpersonal links among the 
employees is highest). 
 
If we increase even more the level of the link value parameter, the result is that the 
average number of incumbents will increase even more: interpersonal links will start 
influencing the results even earlier in the industrys evolution, and firms will more 
easily retain employees, in spite of their relatively low performance. This also means 
that successful entry becomes more probable in later periods, since there will be more 
incumbent firms with low levels of performance, which can be challenged by late-
comers. 
 
 
3.3. Logarithmic and Exponential friendship functions 
 
The results that have been presented and discussed in the last section refer to 
simulations in which the linear version of the friendship function was used. This 
means that, when an individual is assessing a firm as a potential employer, the value of 
that firm to the individual is equal to the performance of the firm plus some constant 
percentage points for each link the individual has among the firms employees. I.e., if 
the link value parameter is fixed at 1%, an additional link with some of the firms 
employees increases the value of that firm to the individual by exactly 1% of the 
performance level, no matter how many friends the individual already has among that 
firms employees.  
 
Of course, this is not the only possible way for interpersonal links to influence 
individual job decisions. In the present section I discuss how the outcomes of the model 
change when two alternative versions of the friendship function are adopted  the 
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exponential form and the logarithmic form. In the case of the exponential friendship 
function, the value an individual attaches to a firm as a potential employer increases 
much more for every new link with that firm when the individual already has many 
friends working there, than when the new link is the first to be established with that 
firms employees. I.e., having few friends working for a firm does not make much 
difference, but having many friends who are employed there can make that firm much 
more attractive as a potential employer. The case of a logarithmic friendship function 
is the inverse one: the difference in terms of individuals valuation between having 1 or 
2 links to a firm is much bigger than the difference of having, say, 10 or 11 links with 
the firms employees. 9 
 
 
Figure 5 - Outcomes of alternative versions of the friendship function  
for different levels of link value  
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Like in the linear case, in both the exponential and the logarithmic versions of the 
friendship function it is possible to identify three main types of outcomes for different 
levels of the link value parameter (see Figure 5). Again, when the level of link value 
is low (area I) the results of the simulation resemble the case of irrelevant interpersonal 
links; and when the link value parameter is fixed at sufficiently high levels, the result 
                                                
9 One possible way to rationalize these alternative functional forms of the friendship function is the 
following. In the exponential case interpersonal links are relevant for reasons of power: having few 
friends in a firm does not alter ones career prospect, while having many friends in a firm grants an easier 
access to promotion and other benefits. In the logarithmic case, individuals are motivated by the pleasure 
of working with close friends; arguably, ones emotional comfort increases much more when switching 
from a job situation where there are no friends among the co-workers to one in which there is one or two 
friends, than when an individual already works with dozens of friends and makes an additional emotional 
link among his colleagues. 
(III) unconcentrated, 
structure 
(III) unconcentrated, 
stable structure(II) concentrated 
structure (II) concentrated 
structure 
(I) unstable
structure (I) unstable 
structure 
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is a relatively stable, unconcentrated industry structure. Also as before, the lower-bound 
of the intermediate range of link value levels (area II in the graphs above) typically 
results in highly concentrated industry structures, with an average HH index above 
6000, which is typical of monopolistic (or quasi-monopolistic) industry structures; and 
link values in the upper-bound of area II give rise to moderate concentrated structures, 
with an average HH index between 2000 and 6000 (see table A.1. in annex).  
 
However, behind the similarities which result from those indicators, one can identify 
significant differences between alternative specifications of the friendship function by 
analysing the details of the industry dynamics.  
 
The most interesting case to emphasize is the behaviour of the Logarithmic friendship 
function for intermediate levels of the link value parameter. In both the Linear and 
the Exponential cases, as the link value increases, there is a smooth transition from a 
stable monopoly (or quasi-monopoly), through different degrees of stable, relatively 
symmetric oligopolies (with decreasing levels of concentration), and finally to rather 
unconcentrated, stable industry structures. On the contrary, the Logarithmic case is 
much more unstable and rather unpredictable  as can be confirmed by the inspection of 
Table A.1. (in annex), which reveals that the levels of the coefficient of variation for 
intermediate levels of the link value parameter are typically much higher in the 
Logarithmic case (for similar average values). While in most cases the main features of 
the industry dynamics are not substantially changed for different runs of the same 
parameterization, in the Logarithmic case, the set of possible outcomes for levels of 
link value in the upper-bound of region II in Figure 5 is huge; in such cases, the same 
parameterization can give rise to very diverse results, which include: stable and unstable 
monopolies, oligopolies of different degrees (usually not totally stable) with or without 
a dominant firm, changes from one type of structure to another at different moments in 
the evolution of the industry, etc. 
 
By now the mechanisms underlying the unpredictability of outcomes in the case of a 
Logarithmic friendship function with moderate levels of link value should be easy to 
understand. Essentially, in such conditions, it is much easier for a firm to enter the 
market successfully even after the shake-out episode.  
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A numerical example may help to elucidate this: consider the case of an individual who 
is working for an incumbent firm, which has current performance level equal to 100, 
and which employs 20 other workers who are all linked to our individual; using a 
Logarithmic friendship function with link value equal to 13%, the value of this firm 
as an employer to our individual is approximately 140; now suppose that one of those 
20 colleagues becomes an entrepreneur and starts a new firm; if the skills of this 
entrepreneur are equal to 130, even if this is the only friend our individual knows in the 
new firm, the value of the later as an employer will be 130*0.09 ≈ 141. I.e., even if the 
density of the network of interpersonal links inside a large, incumbent firm is very high, 
this will not necessarily prevent poaching by new competitors  especially if the new 
firms entrepreneur is highly skilled and well positioned in the network.  
 
It is also interesting to note that the unpredictability resulting from intermediate values 
of the Logarithmic friendship function disappears as the level of the link value 
parameter increases even more. The reason for this is the following: intermediate levels 
of link value do not totally prevent the mobility of workers between firms in the initial 
stages of the industrys evolution (although average job changes are somewhat reduced, 
when compared to an equivalent parameterization of the linear case); even though 
individuals attach great value to their first friends, this is usually not enough to 
guarantee the survival of low performing firms; on the contrary, when the link value is 
very high, as soon as a link is established within a firm, this will hardly ever exit the 
market, regardless of its performance. In rigour, for high link values, the very same 
process occurs with both other functional forms of the friendship function.   
 
Finally, it is worth to discuss why the Exponential form of the friendship function 
does not give rise to significant different results of the Linear case. One should recall 
that in the Exponential case the effect of interpersonal links on individuals job 
decisions is rather small until the industry has evolve enough for the social network to 
become sufficiently dense. This implies that in the initial stage of the industrys 
evolution interpersonal links are not playing a significant role, and the mobility of 
individuals between firms is higher. As the industry evolves, an increasing number of 
interpersonal links is being established, leading to a stabilization of the industry 
following the same lines as in the Linear case. From that moment on, the densification 
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of interpersonal links will happen basically inside the incumbent firms; since the impact 
of links is increasing with the densification of the network, further job changes become 
increasingly improbable. This helps to explain the very low levels of later turbulence in 
the Exponential case, even for moderate levels of the link value parameter. 
  
Figure 6 summarizes the essential aspects of the discussion put forward in this section. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Comparing the Logarithmic and the Exponential  
friendship functions with the Linear one 
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
The model presented in this paper was built in order to analyse the interdependencies 
between labour market dynamics and the evolution of industries structure, in situations 
where individuals job decisions are influenced by interpersonal links among workers. 
One crucial motivation for the development its was the scarcity of models of industrial 
dynamics suitable to those industries that strongly depend on highly skilled workers, 
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and in which labour mobility can have significant impacts on the patterns of the 
industrys evolution. 
 
I argued in the introduction that the existing models of industry evolution and of job 
mobility, because they ignore the co-evolution of the product and the labour markets, 
tend to miss some relevant elements of the industries mentioned above. It is now time to 
discuss how the model put forward in this paper can contribute to the analysis of such 
contexts. 
 
I start by referring the prevailing theories of industries life-cycle. Many industries have 
been found to follow some similar pattern along their development, in which the 
following are included (for an overview, see Klepper, 1997): in their initial stage of 
development industries grow fast, many firms enter the market offering their own 
products, few firms exit, and the number incumbents increases accordingly; as the 
industry evolves the industries growth slows down, the entry rate decreases, and there 
is a shake-out in the total number of incumbents; after that, changes in the market share 
of leading firms become less frequent, entry and exits are strongly reduced, and the 
industry structure stabilizes. 
 
Several different theories were suggested to explain these regularities. For example, in 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978), after an initial period of uncertainty in which several 
firms offer their product innovation, a dominant design emerges in the market, reducing 
the uncertainty about the future technological trajectories; this creates an incentive for 
firms to invest in cost-reducing innovations, and the firms who are less efficient in the 
production of the dominant design are driven out of the market. Klepper (1996) has 
reversed the direction of causality, suggesting that the emergence of a dominant design 
is a result of the shake-out, rather than being at its origin; and the causes for the shake-
out are to be found elsewhere: they are related to the fact that cost-reducing investments 
are more rewarding for firms operating at larger scales; firms that grow first tend to 
have lower costs and drive others out of the market. After the shake-out, as prices 
decrease further and margins are compressed, the incentives to grow above the average 
will vanish, and the industry stabilizes. Jovanovic and McDonald (1994) propose still 
another explanation for the shake-out episode, based on the idea of an exogenous 
technological development to which only some firms are able to adapt successfully.  
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What those three alternative explanations have in common is the fact that they are based 
on the assumption that price is a crucial variable for firms competitiveness. And while 
this is true for most industries, it is more relevant for some industries than to others.  
 
As was shown in section 3, for many different sets of parameters, the model proposed 
here gives rise to the same regularities in the evolution of industries which were 
identified before, but it does that on the basis of quite different mechanisms. As in 
Klepper (1996), there are in my model some first-mover advantages, but these are now 
related more with the dynamics of the network of interpersonal links than with any kind 
of durable superior performance; in fact, firms that perform well enough in the early 
stage are more likely to survive, even if their performance levels decrease afterwards  
since they can rely on the influence of interpersonal links among its employees to attract 
new specialists and to prevent poaching from competitors. However, and again 
contrarily to Kleppers model, such first-mover advantages are not permanent in the 
present case: as was shown, even firms which attempt to enter the industry after the 
shake-out episode may be able to grow and survive; this is because the established firms 
tend to reduce their performance levels as they grow (the paradoxical risk of success), 
giving the opportunity for new firms to poach their employees (as long as this new firms 
reveal high performance levels and their entrepreneurs are well located in the network 
of interpersonal links). Still, such successful entries by late-comers become increasingly 
difficult, and this is explains the fact that the industry structure tends to stabilize after 
the shake-out.  
 
The present model is also able to propose alternative explanations for the most 
commonly observed patterns of job mobility. Farber (1999) identifies three main 
regularities in this domain: (i) long job tenures are a common feature in most markets, 
(ii) most new jobs have a short duration, and (iii) the probability of job cessation 
decreases with tenure. Two main classes of models have been put forward to discuss 
such regularities. On one hand, we have models based on the idea of efficient matching 
between the workers human capital and the specific capital of the firm. The other type 
of models is based on the notion of non-observable heterogeneity among workers, 
related with the individual propensity for job change. Both types of models have been 
able to successfully replicate the regularities mentioned above. 
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In the model presented in this paper the same regularities about job mobility are 
observed. But, again, the mechanisms suggested are to some extent distinct from the 
ones proposed by both matching models and model based on non-observable individual 
heterogeneity.  
 
The short duration of many jobs is here related to two phenomena. First, they are a 
direct consequence of the entry and exit of firms in the first stage of the industry 
evolution (and of the indirect effects related to the vacancy chains). Second, they derive 
from the fact that, in the initial stage of the industry evolution, individuals are mainly 
driven by the will to work for high performing firms; but job mobility in this period is a 
self-reinforcing mechanism  the more individuals change jobs in the search for higher 
financial rewards, the more firms change their position in the ranking of performance, 
creating the conditions for further mobility.  
 
However, as the industry evolves, a growing number of interpersonal links is 
established, and individuals choices are increasingly influenced by them. The longer an 
individual stays in a firm, the higher the number of links she establishes with her 
colleagues and the less likely becomes the poaching by other firms. 
 
It should go without saying that the appropriateness of these alternative explanations for 
understanding real world phenomena can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. But 
it may be sensible to adequate the theoretical explanations to the specific contexts under 
analysis. This is what the present model attempts to do, having in mind the evolution of 
consultancy services, as well as other industries which strongly rely on the availability 
of highly skilled labour.  
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A.1. - Main indicators used in the analysis* 
 
 
Turbulence  Job Changes External links  Link value 
Final 
Inc. CR4 HHI  Initial Later Initial Later Initial Later 
Final 
Density  
9,1 76 2518 0,18 0,18 0,45 0,29 0,02 0,12 0,40 
0.001 
28 3 11 6 11 8 14 9 9 5 
1,7 93 6696 0,20 0,17 0,40 0,04 0,02 0,05 0,57 
0.005 38 1 9 8 45 7 46 10 51 3 
3,5 92 3168 0,19 0,00 0,23 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,33 
0.025 30 4 32 14 231 8 9 9 16 23 
13,6 44 921 0,08 0,00 0,10 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,08 
L
in
ea
r 
0.125 9 7 7 5 253 7 58 28 26 9 
9,6 75 2538 0,19 0,18 0,42 0,30 0,02 0,13 0,40 
0.01 
27 2 9 7 11 7 11 10 10 4 
2,1 94 6165 0,21 0,10 0,20 0,03 0,01 0,07 0,55 
0.10 58 1 18 15 45 10 35 11 37 11 
3,7 87 4180 0,15 0,03 0,15 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,39 
0.13 62 12 58 23 105 14 50 25 76 42 
12,5 47 990 0,08 0,01 0,10 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,09 
L
og
ar
ith
m
ic
 
0.25 13 10 11 6 89 7 40 37 36 15 
9,1 72 2071 0,18 0,16 0,45 0,35 0,02 0,13 0,37 
0.0003 
26 3 9 6 8 6 11 7 7 4 
1,5 92 7084 0,19 0,01 0,43 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,56 
0.001 54 1 15 8 210 8 43 10 111 9 
3,4 93 3133 0,20 0,00 0,28 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,33 
0.01 24 4 20 8 707 8 8 10 17 16 
14,2 43 890 0,08 0,00 0,09 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,08 
E
xp
on
en
tia
l 
0.1 
10 7 7 5 330 6 39 26 25 9 
 
 
* The values shown for the link value parameter were chosen in order to make the 
different friendship functions comparable. In each cell there are two figures: the one on 
the top corresponds to the average value of the corresponding indicator; the one on the 
bottom is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation as a percentage of the 
mean). 
 
